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Identity Crisis: Howthe Outcome
ofthe ColdWar affects our
I-lnderstanding ofthe Crisis in
Llkraine
Sara Catherine Lichon
Ramapo College of NewJersey
Abstract
This paper discusses how history affects the present, arguing that the outcome of
the Cold War aids our understanding of the current Ukraine Crisis by shedding
light on the identity crises which Ukraine, Russia, and the United States faced
after the Soviet Union collapsed. These new identities conflicted with each
other, ultimately leading to the conflict we are facing today. The paper starts
by discussing what the Ukraine Crisis is: current fighting between pro-Russian
separatists in eastern Ukraine and Ukrainian troops, due to conflict that began
after Ukrainian pro-Russian president Vilctor Yanukovych was overthrown
in 2014. The situation in Ukraine did not spontaneously appear, but is the
culmination of many years of tension and conflicting identities. Because of
Ukraine's long, intertwined history with Russia, many Ukrainians in the
eastern reaches of the country believe they are more Russian than Ukrainian,
and many of them are ethnically Russian. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, many Russians were displaced and found themselves living in newly
independent Ukraine, which they did not consider their homeland. Meanwhile,
those in western Ukraine were closer to the democratic west, and ideas of free
democracy were more prevalent.
Also discussed is how Russia, after losing its identity as an empire, did not
know what its relationship was with the post-Soviet states, causing it to revert
back to an imperial state of mind, explaining its desire to get involved in the
Ukraine Crisis. Meanwhile, the U.S. wishes to become involved in order
to protect the New World Order and its identity as victor of the Cold War.
However, the U.S. is also hesitant to interfere too much, as it could lead to a
new Cold War and threaten its status as the victor. These conflicting identities
all contribute to the Ukraine Crisis, and this paper aims to describe how this
information can be used to better understand the crisis.
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Introduction
Currently, the country of Ukraine is in the midst of a crisis: separatists
are wishing to break away from the region, the government is attempting to
keep their sovereignty and integrity, the Russian goverrrment is overstepping
its bounds, and the West is attempting to make sense of the situation. As the
conflict continues to escalate, it becomes harder and harder to understand what
exactly is going on. Those in Western Europe and the United States view Russia
as becoming aggressive and imperialistic, attempting to recreate the Soviet
Union by taking away Ukraine's sovereignty. Those in Russia see themselves
protecting Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine from a cruel government.
Ukraine itself is split; those in western Ukraine see Russia inftinging on their
freedom, while those in eastern Ukraine (specifically Crimea and the Luhansk
and Donetsk regions) see Russia as a safe-haven and the country to which they
belong. These many different views have their roots in the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union fell, the many
independent states created by it were at a loss, unsure of their new identities.
Russia itself was unsure of its relationship to the post-Soviet nations, while
the West, particularly the U.S., was sure of its new identity as the victor of
the Cold War and leader of the new world order, or the world created by a
dominant U.S.. Ultimately, the outcome of the Cold War created conflicting
identities between east and west Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, and
these identities have all boiled over into the current Ukraine Crisis the world
faces today.
What is the Ukraine Crisis?
Before delving into the question of how the outcome of the Cold War
led to the Ukraine Crisis, it is important to understand what exactly the
Ukraine Crisis is and what perceptions surround it. In November 2013, several
hundred students in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev protested in Independence
Square, demanding that then-Ukrainian president Viklor Yanukorych sign
an Association Agreement with the European Union. This already-drafted
agreement would have aligned Ukraine's economy with Europe's by adding
Ukraine to the free-market alliance between multiple European countriesr,
meaning that Ukraine would be able to trade with these other European
countries without tariffs or restrictions. The Association Agreement between
Ukraine and the EU included a set of conditions that Yanukovych was not
willing to accept, however: electoral reforms to Ukraine's government to make
I Diuk, "Euromaiden: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution."
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it more democratic, and an end to "selective justice," or the imprisonment of
many opposition govemment leaders on political charges.2 Yanukovych also
claimed that Ukraine faced financial difficulties that could only be solved by
working with Russia, so, in December 2013, he signed a gas deal with Russian
President Vladimir Putin, making it clear that he wanted Ukraine's economy to
be connected to Russia's rather than to Europe's.3 Ukrainian college sfudents
in Kiev, who had started to feel excitement at the prospect of being closer to
Europe, were angered by Yanukovych's decision, and they began organizing
protests in the center of the city.
These protests were unique in that, while they were started by a small
group of people, they grew into a large and violent revolution that created
a lasting impact. Hundreds of students gathered in the city square - called
Independence Square in English but Maiden in Ukrainian - in order to
peacefully demand that Yanukovych sign the Association Agreement. On
November 30, however, the Berkut, Ukraine's special forces, were sent to the
square to clear the protesters. Their methods were violent and extreme, beating
students with batons until they were covered in blood. The Ukrainian people
were outraged by the govemment's brutal response to peaceful protests, and
the protests rapidly grew into the Euromaiden Revolution, named such for its
pro-European direction in Maiden Square. Seven hundred thousand people
protested in the city on December l, facing the wrath of Berkut forces. Months
passed, thousands of more people joineda, and Kiev functioned as a war zone
until February 2014, when Yanukolych fled to Russia and abandoned his post
as president.s
Many had thought ttrat the situation would end there. But soon after
in Crimea, a peninsula in eastern lJkraine, armed, unidentified men seized
airports and government buildings in Simferopol.6 It was unclear whether
these men were Ukrainian or Russian, but the majority of people living in
Crimea were not supportive of the revolution in Kyiv, fearing that the new pro-
Western goverrment would not represent Crimean identity and interests. Those
in Crimea, who are mostly ethnically Russian, had their own protests against
the revolution and asked the Russian government for protection, fearing that
their rights would be taken away.7 This eventually led to a referendum where
ninety seven percent of Crimeans voted to join Russia. Soon after that, eastern
2 rbid.
3 Ibid.
4 rbid.
5 "Ukraine Crisis: Timeline of Major Events."6 rbid.
7 *95.7yo of Crimeans in referendum voted to join Russia - preliminary results."
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Ukrainian separatists declared the areas of Luhansk and Donetsk "People's
Republics," officially sparking the crisis.s It is up for debate between the East
and the West on whether or not Russia is sending soldiers to Ukraine to help
the separatists fight the current war.
Each side has a different perspective on the situation. Those in Luhansk
and Donetsk believe they are fighting a war against a fascist Ukrainian
government and its aggressive ally, the United States; they are hoping to free
the Ukrainians from Western tyranny and bring them back to Russia's fold. A
soldier fighting on the side of the separatists justified his fighting by saying,
"we came to help our orthodox brothers in their righteous fight against fascists,
NAIO, Americans, and imperialism."e A Spanish volunteer also fighting for
the separatists explained his view: "It's not a Russian-Ukrainian war, it is a
Ukraine civil war. The government in Kiev sent militaries to kill, ready to
kill, to make a civil war."r0 Those who are eastern Ukrainian feel the strongest
about this. In the eastern, rebel-controlled town of Pervomaysk, which was
on the frontlines of the conflict, mayor Olga Ischenko, "wanted to know if
its [the nearby town of Popasnaya] people were yearning to be liberated by
the rebels."rrAnother woman in Pervomaysk, Natalya Sokolik, explained how
"according to the opinion of the people here, they would not like to be part of
Ukraine again after everything they have experienced."r2
Meanwhile, those in Russia have their own opinions on the crisis
in Ukraine. Many in the West believe that the Kremlin (a term used for the
Russian government, similar to how the U.S. goverrrment is often referred to
as the White House) wishes to use the crisis as a way to claim parts of Ukraine
as Russiaos own, or at least to draw eastern Ukraine into Russia's sphere of
influence; in fact, this has already happened in Crimea. The reasoning behind
this is that Russia sees Ukraine and Russia as one nation, due to their shared
history and cultural similarities. Alexander Orlov, the Russian Ambassador to
France, once said that "Russians and Ukrainians are one nation...You can't
separate them."r3 The reason Russia feels the need to intervene in Ukraine
is also because of the belief that Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine
are being violated; shortly after a new government replaced Yanukovych,
Ukrainian Parliament abolished a 2012law that allowed Russian to be used
8 "Ukraine Crisis: Timeline of Major Events."
9 "Russian Roulette Dispatch 102."
10 rbid.
1l Judah, "Ukraine: Divided and Bitter."
12 rbid.
l3 Snyder, "IJkraine: Putin's Denial."
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as an official language alongside Ukrainian.ra This, in Russia's eyes, justified
military intervention. 1 5
Those in the West, however, have a drastically different view of the
situation. They believe that Russia has invaded Ukraine illegally, and thus
refuse to recognize any of the new developments, such as the annexation of
Crimea. Timothy Snyder, anAmerican historian who blogged frequently about
the Ukraine Crisis and its impact on international politics from a Western
perspective, stated in one of his posts, "Russia has illegally invaded, occupied,
and annexed the Crimean peninsula, the southernmost province of Ukraine.. .
The Russian intervention in Ukraine has been justified by absurd lies."r6 Even
the United States goveflrment blames the crisis on Russian intervention; at
a hearing of the U.S. Senate Commiffee on Foreign Relations on Ukraine,
Ambassador John E. Herbst stated that "the Kremlin began its hybrid war in
Ilkraine's east" in order to "undermine the post-Cold War order."l7 Victoria
Nuland, theAssistant Secretary ofthe Bureau ofEuropean and EurasianAffairs
at the time, claimed that "Crimea and parts of eastem Ukraine are suffering a
reign of terror," and that the crisis was a "manufactured conflict - controlled
by the Kremlin" and "its separatist puppets."rs
The West, especially the United States, also views Russia as bitter about
losing the Cold War, and feeling threatened by a growing W'estern international
presence. Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John
Kornblum's testimony at the hearing on Ukraine stated that "current Russian
leaders appear to view the growing encroachment of the Westem way of life
as an existential challenge."re Llkraine comes into play here for its pro-Western
revolution; if Ukraine succeeds in becoming westernized, the Western world
would be physically closer to Russia. Former Principal Deputy under Secretary
of Defense Brian P. McKeon ended his testimony by saying that "Russia's
aggressive actions in Ukraine are a threat to a bipartisan objective ofAmerican
policy since the end of the Cold War of seeking a Europe whole, free, and
at peace."20 The westem and eastern views of the crisis oppose each other,
making it nearly impossible to fully understand what is truly happening in
Ukraine. The question is, why do these certain perceptions exist? The answer
lies in the outcome of the Cold War, and the identity crisis that followed it.
14 "Canceled language law in Ukraine sparks concern among Russian and EU diplomats."
l5 Snyder, "Llkraine: The Edge of Democracy."
t6 rbid.
17 Herbst, "U.S. Policy in Ukraine."
18 Nuland, "U.S. Policy in Ukraine."
l9 Komblum, "U.S. Policy in Ukraine."
20 McKeon, "U.S. Policy in lJkraine."
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Identity Crisis in Post-Cold War Ukraine
There are many different angles for one to view the crisis from, but
perhaps the most important thing to look at is the perception of the Ukrainians.
The situation in Ukraine did not spontaneously appear, but rather is the
culmination of many years of tension and conflicting ideals. After the Cold
War ended, those in Ukraine entered an identity crisis, with some of the
population feeling they were Russian while the rest feeling that they were
purely Ukrainian. Ukraine's history is turbulent and murky, having been
intertwined with Russian history for many years.2r After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, a "new Russian diaspora" was created, as ethnically Russian and
Russian-speaking minorities suddenly found themselves no longer in Russia,
but in the independent country of llkraine.22 The final Soviet population census
in 1989 stated that seventeen percent of the Soviet Russian population was in
the new post-Soviet states - specifically 25.3 million people - and the number
of people of Russian-based nationalities who were now outside of Russia was
28.2 million, ninety percent of which were ethnically Russian.23 Such a large
number of Russians living outside of Russia was bound to create a problem at
some point, as these people felt no loyalty or personal connection to their new
homes, including Ukraine.
This issue of ethnically Russian people living in a country that they do
not consider their home is especially clear in Crimea. Crimea had been a part
of Russia since 1783, when the Tsarist Empire defeated the Ottoman Empire in
the Battle of Kozludzha.ln 1954, Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev gave
the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine as a gift, though its population was made up
of mainly ethnically Russian people. About seventy-five percent of Crimeans
in the 1950s were Russian, due to a combination of immigration and "ethnic
cleansing" done by Stalin when he forced Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks
out of the peninsula.2a Khrushchev's gift of Crimea to Ukraine was meant
to symbolize Soviet control over Ukraine, emphasizing the unity of the two
countries, while also introducing a significant Russian population to Ukraine.2s
At the time of the transfer, this was not seen as an issue, as Ukrainians were
considered very culturally close to Russians. On February 19, 1954, at the
meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the government body
made up of the parliaments from each Soviet state) that discussed the transfer
2l Prizel, "Case of Ukraine," 114.
22 Rudensky, "Russian Minorities," 58.
23 Ibid.,59.
24 Krameq "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?"
25 Ibid.
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of Crimea to Ukraine, M. P. Tarasov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of Russia, stated that Ukraine and Russia had a friendship and
were culturally united:
The Ukrainian people have tied their fate with the Russian
people since olden times. For many centuries they fought against
common enemies...The century-long friendship of the Ukrainian
and Russian peoples and the economic and cultural link between
Crimea and Ul<raine were consolidated still f,lther with the
victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution...The transfer of
the Crimean Oblast'to the Ukrainian Republic meets the interests
of strengthening the friendship of the peoples of the great Soviet
Union, and will promote the fi.rther strengthening of the fraternal
link between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples...26
Those in the Soviet Union at the time considered Ukraine and Russia to be one
nation due to their shared history and culture, making the transfer of Crimea to
Ukraine logical and understandable.
This transfer would later cause an issue when the Soviet Union fell
apart,however. Cremea's population was still mostly Russian decades later-
fifty-eight percent or 1.2 million people in 2001-and many wanted to have
closer ties with Russia rather than with Ukraine, feeling as though they were
minorities in the overall population of Ukraine.2T This created lasting tensions
which have bubbled to the surface multiple times, even prior to the Ukraine
Crisis. For example, in March 2006, pro-Russian Crimean politicians organized
protests against NATO exercises that were to happen in June, which soon
spread to other areas of eastern Ukraine where the majority of the population
spoke Russian.2s Because some in Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine see
themselves as Russian rather than Ukrainian, they consider the Ukrainian
govemment and the'West their enemy, because the West is attempting to keep
them from breaking away from Ukraine and joining Russia. This has reached
a climax in the current crisis.
Those in the western parts of Ukraine, however, have a different
perspective on the crisis. Unlike the Crimean and separatist Ukrainians,
they do not feel a bond with Russia - in fact, they wish to break away from
Russia as much as possible and form their own independent identity. Most
of Ukraine's history has consisted of being caught in a game of tug-of-war
26 "Meeting ofthe Presidium ofthe Supreme Soviet ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."27 Wilson, 104.
28 Lucas, The New Cold War, 147.
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between Russia and European powers. Long before the Cold V/ar, in the
seventeenth century Ukraine was split between Poland and Russia; Poland
owning the territory to the west of the Dnieper fuver and Russia owning the
territory to the east. As the decades passed, Russia acquired more and more of
this western portion, controlling most of modern-day Ukraine by 1772. The
small portion of Ukraine that was not ruled by Russia in1772 became known as
Lviv, and was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the nineteenth century
Ukrainian nationalism began to form in the area ruled by Austria-Hungary
as people fled eastern Russian rule due to a lack of economic progress and
poor living conditions. This nationalism grew during World War I, when the
Bolsheviks in Russia signed atreaty with Germany in order to avoid conflict
in 1918. This treaty ceded parts of Russian territory to the Central Powers and
granted independence to other areas, such as Ukraine. But Ukraine's taste of
independence did not last long; the treaty was nullified later with Germany's
defeat, and Ukraine refurned to Russia's control.2e
The game of tug-of-war did not end there, and Ukraine was once again
split between east and west. Poland claimed Lviv and other parts of western
Ukraine at the end of World War I, while the rest of Ukraine became part of the
Soviet Union in 1922, after many battles between the Soviets and Poland. But
life in Soviet Ukraine was not easy; under the rule of Josef Stalin, agriculture
was collectivized, and food grown in rural parts of Ukraine was collected
to feed the entire Soviet population. This led to a massive famine in 1932
and 1933, known as Holodomor, where around three million people starved
to death. This further fueled Ukrainian wishes for independence, and during
World War II, some Ukrainians joined forces with Nazi authorities, hoping
that aiding in a German victory and a Soviet defeat would lead to Germany
granting Ukraine independence (hence why pro-Russian separatists believe
they are fighting fascists). After World War II, however, the Soviet Union
expanded, and the areas of Ukraine under Polish control were seized.3o After
the constant shifts in power within Ukraine, Ukrainians had a desire to form
their own identity separate from those who ruled them while imposing harsh
conditions.
The opporfunity to gain independence arrived in 1991 , with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. When Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev enacted
his perestroika and glasnost reforms, the economy entered a state of chaos.
Perestroika consisted of decentralizing the Soviet economy while glasnost
consisted of the democratization of the Soviet Union, but these reforms
29 Tharoor, "Maps: How Ukraine became Ukraine."
30 rbid.
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bacldred, as the economy disintegrated instead of improved, and increased
freedom of the press made it easier to point out Gorbachev's failures.3r
According to Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, there was much appeal
in leaving the Soviet Union, "[t]o. as politics opened up while prosperity
lagged behind, it became hard to see what benefits a state...got from being
part of the Soviet lJnion."32 Soon the Soviet states began to break away from
the failing center one by one33, and on August 24, 1997, Ukraine declared its
independence.
Today, western Ukrainians are wary of Russian imperialism returning.3a
After centuries of being victims of Russian rule and tyranny, it is no surprise
that Ukraine would want to protect its independence and remain outside of
Russia's shadow. Ukrainians feel that their country has been ignored as a
nation for most of its history35, constantly being part of other nations; now,
Ukraine wishes to have an identity of its own as a sovereign European country.
According to political scientist Ilya Pizel, during the twentieth century
"outsiders have confused Ukraine with Russia and rejected Ukraine as a
legitimate player within the international system," and thus it makes sense
that Ukraine would want'to establish a separate identity from Russia."36 But
the fear that Russia will again gain control over Ukraine remains in the air.
Stephan Khmara, a member of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party,
once said that "as long as the Russian empire exists, its neighbors will live
under direct threat to their security and independence."3T This 'teflect[s] the
feelings of many Ukrainians,o'according to Prizel.38
The way western Ukrainians attempt to form their own identity is
through integration into the European system - the firther they can break
away from Russia, the more likely that Europe and the world will view
Ukraine as a sovereign nation. After gaining independence from the Soviet
Union, the Ukrainian government, along with the governments of other newly
independent states, turned towards "Euroatlanticism," according to joumalist
Edward Lucas. Euroatlanticism was the integration into the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NAIO) and the European Union, which would mean
"a commitment to cleaning up and modernizing all the debris of totalitarian
31 Raeff, "The Gorbachev Era: Perestroika and Glasnost."
32 Gaddis, The Cold War: ANew History,254.
33 rbid.
34 Prizel,l24.
35 Ibid., 118-9.
36 tbid.
37 Ibid., 124.
38 rbid.
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rule."3e By joining the European Union, as discussed in the previous section
when Ukraine wished to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine
would reform their government in order to make it more democratic, and also
become involved in the free trade alliance between various European counffies.
By joining NATO, Ukraine would be part of an international military alliance
that also promotes democratic ideals. By committing to democratic reform,
Ukraine would greatly distance itself from its communist Soviet past, forming
an identity separate from Russia.
Additionally, Euromaiden was not Llkraine's only pro-Western
revolution; in 2004, western Ukrainians protested the election of Viktor
Yanukovych as president, claiming the election was rigged. These protests
became known as the Orange Revolution, and were another instance of east
versus west, where Russians and pro-Russian eastern Ukrainians supported
Yanukovych while Europeans and western Ukrainians supported his opponent,
Viktor Yushchenko.a0 Eastern and western Ukraine's conflicting identities
caused conflict as the western side tried to forge a new path for themselves,
while the eastern side did not wish to follow that path. The conflicts have only
heightened now during the Ukraine Crisis. The split between the eastern corner
of Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine is rooted in the complex history between
Ukraine and Russia that lasted until the end ofthe Cold War. While Crimea and
the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine identifu with their shared history
with Russia, western Ukraine is resentful of the many years it suffered under
Russia's rule. These different perspectives of Ukrainian-Russian history have
led to the current perspectives in the Ukraine Crisis, and are the source of the
tension between the two sides.
The Fallen Empir+What is Russia?
One must not forget the other major powers that are present in the
Ukraine Crisis. One country that went through a major identity crisis after
the Cold War was Russia. Russia, being at the center of the Soviet Union and
the head of the empire, experienced a loss of identity when the Soviet Union
collapsed.ar Due to their control over the many Soviet states, the notion of
a Russian empire was a major part of Russian national identity,a2 so the fall
of the Soviet Union created a sense of confusion. Russia questioned what its
relationship was with the other post-Soviet states; does Russia still lead these
39 Lucas,130.
40 Schneider, "IJlcraine's'Orange Revolution."'
4l Prizel, I l7-8.
42 lbid.
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states? Does it still have the responsibility to maintain control over them? In
general, what is Russia?43 As "the state that claims to be the heir and legal
successor of the USSR," in the words of historian Roman Szporluk, Russia
faced difficulty in accepting the sovereignty of the "near abroad," or other
post-Soviet states.4
The Russian government was unable to fully abandon their imperial
state of mind, explaining its desire to get involved in the conflicts of Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin is perhaps the clearest example of this. Putin has become an
extremely powerful man, both within his country and in the world. Part of the
reason he has gained a tremendous amount of power and support within Russia
is because of his promise to rebuild Russia to what it once was during the Cold
War and create a new political union between the post-Soviet states.as Putin
praises the golden days of the Soviet era, and he has argued that the collapse of
the Soviet Union has made "the Russian nation...one of the biggest, if not the
biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders." He has also stated
that "the aspiration ofthe Russians, ofhistorical Russia, [is] to restore unity."+o
Putin has made it clear that his goal is to reunite the Russian people, and,
seeing as many Russians are in the post-Soviet states, it seems this is the major
reasoning behind why Russia is involved in the affairs of these states. Russia's
involvement in Ukraine is part of a larger plan Putin has to restore unity.
The loss of Ukraine specifically has left Russia in a confused and hurt
state, because the history ofthe two nations is so connected. Starting as early as
the eighth century, these two countries were intertwined. The first major center
of the Rus people, whose name the word Russia is derived from, was in Kiev,
which is currently the capital of Ukraine. In the 1600s, I-Ikraine was divided
up amongst numerous people, such as the Hungarians, Ottomans, Swedes, and
Cossacks, but most notably was split between Poland and Russia, as mentioned
in the previous section. Under Catherine the Great's ruIe in the seventeenth
centu4r, the area along the Black Sea was referred to as Novorossiyao or New
Russia (which is currently a term used by separatists). When the Soviet Union
was formed, Ukraine was incorporated into it in 1922, ffid was used as a
breadbasket; the massive famine in the 1930s prompted Russian speakers to
immigrate to Ukraine to'omake up the numbers" of the Soviet population who
died.aT
43 Szporluk, "lntroduction," 8.44 rbid.
45 Wilson,32.
46 Ibid.,34.
47 Tharoor.
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Indeed, the shared history between these two nations makes it seem
that Ukraine's secession is the cause of the "disintegration of the Russian
federation," to use Prizel's phrasing.a8 When the Soviet Union fell apart,
Russia did not consider the new, independent states as foreign countriesae,
especially not Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are extremely intertwined to the
point where many Ukrainians are seen as Russian, and this made the separation
of Ukraine from Russia "emotionally" damaging.'o Russian historiography
emphasizes the connectedness of the two nations, and "usually tried to deny
the Ukrainian state and people had a separate existence at a11," according
to journalist Andrew Wilson, who has done much research on Russia and
Ukraine.sr Combining the shared history with the transfer of Crimeas2 makes
it so that Ukraine and Russia are so connected that severing that connection is
seen as almost a blasphemous deed. As Gorbachev once said to U.S. President
George Bush at Malta, o'The Soviet peoples would not understand [separation].
We lived together for fifty years, we are integrated...In the Ukraine, 50 million
are non-Ukrainian."s3 Such a belief in the integration of the Russian and post-
Soviet people, Ukrainians specifically, shows that Ukraine's independence is
severely damaging to Russia's image and identity.s4 Furthernore, the issue of
Russian minorities in these new post-Soviet states remains a major problem. As
discussed earlier, there were millions of Russians who were part of the Soviet
Union and "[s]uddenly...found themselves uncomfortable and unwelcome, but
with no place to go."ss Because of this, many Russian politicians believe that
the interests of Russian minorities in other countries lie in Russia's hands.s6
This dedication which Russia developed towards minorities has caused Russia
to become increasingly interested in the affairs of the post-Soviet countries,
including l-Ikraine, and explains why Russia insists that the rights of minorities
in eastern Ukraine are being threatened.
This desire to protect minorities, combined with the need to maintain a
portion of control over the post-Soviet states, has contributed to the current
tension between the West and Russia. As the Cold War was nearing a conclusion,
Bush and Gorbachev had many conversations in order to formally bring an end
to the conflict. During one of these conversations at the Malta Summit in 1989,
48 Prizel, I18.
49 Guroff, "The Paradox of RussianNational Identity," 91.
50 lbid.
5l Wilson, "UkrainianNationalism."
52 Guroff,94.
53 Bush and Gorbachev, US Memorandums of Conversation.
54 Prizel, I18.
55 Guroff,92.
56 Ibid.,9l.
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the question of the sovereignty of new nations came up; Gorbachev did not
want the United States to interfere with the newly emerging states. Gorbachev
explained how the "right of each country to make its own choices and also the
right of nations to change that initial choice" was "an internal matter," and
that the United States should concern itself more with an issue of separatism
in Quebec because it is closer to the United States: 'oI wonder why the U.S.
Congress is so concerned about the Soviet federation instead of trying to help
Canada which is much closer and more important to you."s7 This opinion of
Gorbachev's was also present in a conversation he had with the Prime Minister
of Canada Brian Mulroney in 1989, where he said:
We are faced with attempts to interfere in the affairs of our
federation on the part of the USA...It is not easy for the Americans
to comprehend the essence of the new world, of the new values.
The habits of the global policemen are still very strong, also
strong is the desire to impose their opinion, the efforts to dictate
others. I will have to tell the President in Malta: if you want to
help somebody, try to help Quebec. It is closer to you, and we will
sort out our problems on our own...the Americans have an itch: to
give everybody advice on how to live...I have to say that as far as
Eastern Europe is concerned, it is hard for the United States to give
up the habit of teaching others.58
Russia, in its own state of confusion after the loss of the Soviet Union empire,
took on the identity of a nation responsible for taking care of and providing
for the new nations that were once part of its empire, and which, in Russian
eyes, would never truly be separate from Russia. This identity is still present
in Russian government policy today, and contributes to the tensions and
animosity felt in the Ukraine Crisis.
Tlotd by the Victor-The Dominant United States
After the Cold War, as Russia found itself at a loss for a new identity, the
West, especially the United States, developed a lasting identity - the victor of
the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union signified the collapse of
communism, and the United States began to lead the world in a o'new world
order."se This new world order was a term that was first used in this context
by United States president George Bush after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
57 Bush and Gorbachev, US Memorandums of Conversation.
58 Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Mulroney.
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During the Cold War, the United States was dedicated to preventing the spread
of communism and encouraging the spread of democracy, and the new world
order that was to come after the Cold War was a world led by the United
States. The collapse of the Soviet Union signified the end of an era, and the
power balance changed; where there was once two global powers in constant
competition, there was now only one major power, creating a new world order.
Bush announced in his State of the Union address in 1992 that the world was
experiencing "changes of almost Biblical proportions" because "communism
died this year."uo Bush emphasized the victory that the United States had
achieved, stating that "the biggest thing that has happened in the world in my
life, in our liveso is this: by the grace of God, America won the cold war. ..For
the cold war didn't end, it was won."6r This emphasis on winning the Cold War
created for the United States an identity of a victor with a commitment to lead
the world as its sole superpower.
The United States was so preoccupied with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, however, that it failed to notice the internal divisions within the post-
Soviet states, focusing instead solely on its desire to defeat the Soviet Union.
According to scholars Gregory and Alexander Guroff, the West has "paid
little attention" to the problem of ethnicity in the post-Soviet world and did
not look into the substance behind the desires to break away from the Soviet
Union, "as the primary goal was desffuction of the [Soviet] empire."62 Those
in the West would ignore the opinion of those who wished to remain a part
of the Soviet Union and instead looked only to those who wished to break
away; for example, the United States was strongly supportive of Ukrainian
far-right independence advocate Viacheslav Chornovil, along with many other
independence leaders in Lithuania, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.63 If the United
States ever knew there were people in these countries who did not want to
leave the Soviet Union, it was never mentioned or documented. The United
States would not have needed to look beyond the liberation movements at the
deeper picture - the liberation of Ukraine and other post-Soviet states was
what the United States wanted, and these independence movements were seen
as a major victory for the West. Political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed
in 1996, a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that "[t]he political
landscape of Europe is fundamentally transformed, for I-Ikraine's existence
transforms Russian power by reducing it significantly and thus making it more
60 rbid.
61 rbid.
62 Guroff,78-9.
63 Ibid.,93.
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manageable."e The smaller Russia's power was, the more "manageable" it
would be, and the easier it would be for the United States to lead its new world
order. Those who wished to remain aligned with Russia would not have served
the United States'pu{pose, and thus went unnoticed.
In the United States' policy in the Ukraine Crisis today, the United
States still does not notice those who wish to remain close to Russia, and still
views itself as a victor with a commitment to the new world order. Nuland's
2015 testimony on the Ukraine Crisis stated that Ukraine played an important
role in the "quest for a 'Europe whole, free and at peace," and that the U.S.
was dedicated to liberating Ukraine "from its comrpt, oligarchic past," and
"chart[ing] a more democratic, European future."6s Rather than acknowledge
that some in eastern Ukraine do not want a European future, the U.S.
government sees those fighting in eastem llkraine on the separatist side as
purely Kremlin puppets and Russians in disguise. Nuland refers to the fighting
as "Russian-fueled violence,"66 and Komblum's testimony also blames Russia
and Putin for the conflict that is undoing the United States'work in creating a
democratic presence in Eastern Europe. Kornblum argues that:
Inthoseyears [the 1990s], we cooperatedto establishconditions for
a peaceful, democratic transition for nations of the former Warsaw
Pact [a treaty between the Soviet Union and the countries within
its bloc]...Today, we can be proud of the secure and prosperous
democratic community of nearly one billion inhabitants which
stretches from the East of Europe to the tip of Alaska...Current
Russia leaders appear to view the growing encroachment of
the Western way of life as an existential challenge...[this] has
helped Putin justify his unbroken flow of troops and material into
I-Ikraine.67
In order to preserve the new world order that it has created, the United States
believes it needs to curb Russia's appetite for the post-Soviet states and maintain
the sense of democracy that these new states have adopted. And though it is
true that Russia has an appetite, it is not solely to blame for the crisis, as there
ire some native eastern Ukrainians who support the separatists and wish to join
Russia. However, because of the United States'identity as winner of the Cold
War, United States policymakers are reluctant to admit that, perhaps, not all of
Ukraine views itself as a victim needing to escape its Russian abuser.
64 Brzezinski, "fJkraine's Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space," 4.
65 Nuland.
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Despite the desire to maintain the new world order, the West, especially
the United States, has actually hesitated when it comes to getting too involved
in the Ukraine Crisis. The West has repeatedly imposed sanctions on Russia
and negotiated ceasefires, but to no avail, as the crisis continues. The West
is hesitant to send its own troops to Ukraine, lest it further escalate tensions
between East and West - this can be seen by the fact that, regardless of how
often U.S. policymakers discuss the need to stabilize Ukraine, they do not send
troops in. This is another ffend that has continued since the end of the Cold
War. In the case of Ukraine specifically, shortly after it gained independence,
it was only discussed in the West in relation to its Soviet nuclear arsenal or
any conflicts with Russia.68 When it came to aiding Ukraine in its mission
for democracy the U.S. steered clear. In fact, "the West viewed Ukraine and
other Soviet republics as 'irrational children'whose 'national interests'were
somehow always menacing," according to Olga Alexandrova, a contributor
to Harvard Ultrainian Studies.be This can be seen in the initial reactions the
West had towards Ukraine when it was striving for independence; in a speech
that Bush gave in Kiev in 1991, he stated that "freedom is not the same as
independence. Americans will not support those who seek in order to replace
a far-offtyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote
a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred."7o This speech, now known
as Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech, reflects an initial hesitance to completely
helping the post-Soviet states fully separate themselves from the Soviet Union.
This is still happening today, as the West does not want to provoke further
conflict that will spread beyond Ukraine to the rest ofthe world. Perhaps this is
because of the image the United States has developed in being the victor of the
Cold War - unwilling to restart the conflict, the United States would prefer to
preserve the "new world order" without getting itself too involved in a conflict
it considers dead and buried; a battle that the United States has won.
Conclusion
The murky Ukraine Crisis is slightly easier to understand if one looks
at the outcome of the Cold War, as after the Soviet Union collapsed, various
nations were forced to take on new, conflicting identities, which led to rising
tensions that have finally come to a boiling point. Ukrainians in Crimea,
Luhansk, and Donetsk who felt they were still connected to Russia are now
currently trying to break away from Ukraine. Western Ukrainians who felt that
68 Alexandrova, "Ukraine and Western Europe," 145
69 Ibid., 146.
70 Bush, speech in Kiev, Ukraine, August l, 1991.
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Russia stifled Ukraine's growth are still attempting to break away from the
former empire. Russia is seeking to retake the country it feels it still rightfully
owns, while the United States is struggling to enforce the new world order
while not provoking a new Cold War after emerging victorious from the first
one. The conflicting identities of victor, fallen empire, free Ukrainians and
displaced Russians has led to the current Ukraine Crisis, and there is no telling
when it will end. Perhaps sffides can be made in the right direction to end it
if we look at how the llkraine Crisis is really an identity crisis, for the sooner
this is turderstood, the easier it will be to turn the crisis from a current event
into history.
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